



ALTERNATIVE FACTS AND THE POST-TRUTH SOCIETY: 
MEETING THE CHALLENGE 
S.I. STRONG† 
During times of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act. 
– George Orwell, 1984 
 
In the hours following the 2017 U.S. presidential inauguration, the world 
was introduced to the concept of “alternative facts,” a term that quickly 
became synonymous with a willingness to persevere with a particular belief 
either in complete ignorance of, or with a total disregard for, reality.1 The 
increasing incidence of alternative facts in the popular and political arena 
creates a critical conundrum for lawyers, judges, legislators, and anyone 
interested in deliberative democracy, since it is unclear how rational debate 
can proceed if empirical evidence holds no persuasive value. 
Although the concept of a “post-truth society” only truly entered the 
cultural consciousness within the last year,2 social scientists from a variety of 
fields, most notably political science and psychology, have long been 
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1 See Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered “Alternative Facts” on Crowd Size, CNN (Jan. 
23, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/ [https://perma.cc/67JJ-
2NPR] (reporting a discussion between Trump advisor Kellyanne Conway and Meet the Press host 
Chuck Todd, in which Conway defended White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer’s description of the 
size of the crowd at the inauguration as an “alternative fact” rather than a “falsehood”). 
2 See Amy B. Wang, “Post-Truth” Named 2016 Word of the Year by Oxford Dictionaries, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truth-named-
2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries/?utm_term=.12aaa7361b38 [https://perma.cc/V75E-LTLH] 
(“Oxford Dictionaries has selected ‘post-truth’ as 2016’s international word of the year, after the 
contentious ‘Brexit’ referendum and an equally divisive U.S. presidential election caused usage of 
the adjective to skyrocket, according to the Oxford University Press.”). 
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interested in how and why individuals and institutions adopt behaviors or 
beliefs that are patently at odds with observable reality. These scholars’ often 
startling conclusions provide important insights for lawyers and policymakers 
struggling to adapt to unprecedented legal and political challenges. 
Traditionally, scholars have characterized political misperceptions as 
“information deficits” arising out of individuals’ “lack of interest in or 
knowledge of politics.”3 Under this view, the best response, according to no 
less eminent an authority than Justice Brandeis, “is more speech.”4 
Lawyers tend to find this approach extremely attractive given their belief, 
honed through years of training, that the best form of persuasion is through 
content-based arguments (so-called “hard evidence”).5 Unfortunately, two 
political scientists, Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler, have empirically 
demonstrated that “more speech” does not in fact cure certain types of 
political misperceptions and may in some cases be counterproductive.6 Their 
research shows that “misperceptions are not just an information problem,” 
which means that “[e]xposure to accurate information may not be enough” to 
counteract individual or institutional adherence to alternative facts.7 
If those findings were not sufficiently sobering, Nyhan and Reifler also 
discovered that attempts to correct misinformation can actually strengthen 
political misperceptions among those who are most strongly committed to 
 
3 Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, The Roles of Information Deficits and Identity Threat in the 
Prevalence of Misperceptions 1, 3 (Nov. 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Nyhan & Reifler, 
Roles], http://www.dartmouth.edu/~nyhan/opening-political-mind.pdf [https://perma.cc/T36Q-HG59]. 
4 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring), 
overruled in part on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Edward Glaeser 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (2014) (quoting 
Whitney for the proposition that “[o]ne of the underlying principles of a system of freedom of 
expression, and indeed of democracy itself, is that if ‘there be time to expose through discourse the 
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is 
more speech, not enforced silence’”); Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2) (“To the 
extent that misperceptions are rooted mainly in failures of information delivery, presenting 
corrective messages in convenient and accessible formats should reduce misperceptions.”). 
5 See Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1398 
(2013) (noting logos tends to be considered hierarchically superior to ethos and pathos in classical 
rhetoric); Katherine R. Kruse, Engaged Client-Centered Representation of the Moral Foundations of the 
Lawyer–Client Relationship, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 577, 584 (2011) (“What the lawyer does—what the 
lawyer has been trained to do and has expertise in doing—is to sort the facts of that human problem 
or situation into a series of legal categories: claims, defenses, procedures, and evidentiary proof.”). 
6 See Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 3 (manuscript at 3) (noting that their “findings provide 
some indication that some misinformed individuals may already be at least tacitly aware of the 
correct information but uncomfortable acknowledging it. If so, misperceptions are not just an 
information problem; the threatening nature of certain facts may also inhibit people from 
acknowledging the true state of the evidence on controversial issues”). 
7 Id. at 1, 3. 
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their initial position.8 This phenomenon is of course extremely problematic 
given the increasingly polarized nature of U.S. society,9 and it helps explain 
why various attempts to correct the factual record during the 2016 presidential 
campaign and the early days of the current administration have been less 
successful than one might expect. Nyhan and Reifler’s data has subsequently 
been used by Edward Glaeser and Cass Sunstein as the basis for a metric to 
evaluate when attempts to correct political misperceptions do more harm 
than good.10 
Nyhan and Reifler’s work provides other critical lessons for the legal 
community. For example, Nyan and Reifler found that people are more likely 
to maintain factually inaccurate beliefs if the information is offered in a 
manner that facilitates counter-argument.11 Resistance to change is 
particularly pronounced when people are presented with both sides of a 
controversy, as is routinely the case in legal and political debates.12 Journalists 
also use the point–counterpoint approach,13 which again helps to explain why 
media reports about factual inaccuracies during the recent presidential 
campaign had very little effect on voter perceptions and practices.14 
Nyhan and Reifler also empirically confirmed several propositions derived 
from the field of psychology. For example, their research demonstrated not 
only that “the threatening nature” of certain facts appeared to “inhibit people 
from acknowledging the true state of the evidence on controversial issues” 
but also that people’s preexisting views were “likely to contribute to 
misperceptions about controversial issues.”15 In particular, Nyhan and Reifler 
 
8 Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 
32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 304 (2010) [hereinafter Nyhan & Reifler, Corrections]. 
9 See James E. Campbell, Opinion, The Source of America’s Political Polarization? It’s Us, L.A. TIMES 
(June 30, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-campbell-political-polarization-20160627-snap-
story.html [https://perma.cc/W8JD-PMG9] (“Even those who enjoy a spirited argument suffer from 
polarization fatigue. But there is no relief coming. Americans are highly polarized and have grown more so.”). 
10 See Glaeser & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 73-90 (detailing formation of the metric and the 
results produced). 
11 See Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 3 (manuscript at 1) (noting that people may have 
misperceptions as a result of encountering information “in formats that easily allow for counter-
argument”). 
12 See Nyhan & Reifler, Corrections, supra note 8, at 304 (“[P]eople typically receive corrective 
information within ‘objective’ news reports pitting two sides of an argument against each other . . . . In 
such cases, citizens are likely to resist or reject arguments and evidence contradicting their 
opinions—a view that is consistent with a wide array of research.” (citations omitted)). 
13 Id. 
14 See Craig Silverman, The Backfire Effect: More on the Press’s Inability to Debunk Bad Information, 
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 17, 2011), http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/the_backfire_effect.php 
[https://perma.cc/P2TZ-B2L9] (“[T]he backfire effect makes it difficult for the press to effectively 
debunk misinformation. We present facts and evidence, and it often does nothing to change people’s 
minds. In fact, it can make people dig in even more.”). 
15 Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 3 (manuscript at 1-3). 
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proved that “[d]irectionally motivated reasoning,” meaning “biases in 
information processing that occur when one wants to reach a specific 
conclusion,” plays a significant role in how people interpret information 
involving political issues.16 As they note, “Misperceptions often fit comfortably 
in people’s worldviews . . . by seeming to confirm people’s prior beliefs.”17 
This latter statement refers to a concept known as “confirmation bias,” 
which is one of many types of cognitive distortions that psychologists study. 
Confirmation bias is defined as the unconscious but pervasive human 
propensity to filter out information that contradicts an existing belief and 
instead retain only information that confirms that belief.18 Other types of 
cognitive distortions that have been shown to affect legal and political 
decisionmaking include positive illusions, hindsight bias, contrast bias, 
procrastination bias, omission bias, normality bias, and the status quo bias.19 
Because these phenomena operate on an unconscious level, they are 
particularly difficult to identify and challenge.20 The situation is further 
exacerbated by the “bias blind spot,” which is reflected in the fact that 
research subjects “were readily persuaded of the aggregate pattern of behavior 
 
16 Id. at 1. 
17 Id. (citation omitted). 
18 See Lawrence M. Solan, Four Reasons to Teach Psychology to Legal Writing Students, 22 J.L. & 
POL’Y 7, 19-20 (2014) (“People tend to seek information that they consider supportive of favored 
hypotheses or existing beliefs and to interpret informaion in ways that are partial to those hypotheses 
or beliefs. Conversely, they tend not to seek and perhaps even to avoid information that would be 
considered counterindicative with respect to those hypotheses or beliefs and supportive of 
alternative possibilities.” (quoting Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous 
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PYSCHOL. 175, 177 (1998)). 
19 See Nick Bostrom & Toby Ord, The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics, 116 
ETHICS 656, 660 (2006) (“Psychologists and experimental economists have found extensive evidence for 
the prevalence of status quo bias in human decision making.”); Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, 
A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 643 (2003) (“[N]ormality bias—a 
tendency for people to react more strongly to bad outcomes that spring from abnormal circumstances than 
to otherwise identical outcomes that spring from more ordinary circumstances—permeates the legal 
landscape. In fact, the normality bias is so strong that it swamps the influence of another well-documented 
bias—the ommission bias—when the two biases push in different directions.”); Jean R. Sternlight & 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Psychology and Effective Lawyering: Insights for Legal Educators, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
365, 370-71 (2015) (noting that “[a]ttorneys can make better predictions and more effectively advise clients 
if they know,” among other things, how positive illusions, anchoring, and hindsight bias “influence 
judgments and decisions made by attorneys, clients, neutrals and others”); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding 
Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1134 (2010) (noting that status quo bias, contrast bias, and procrastination 
bias may affect individuals’ judgment in certain circumstances). 
20 See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK 
& UNCERTAINTY 7, 9 (1988) (noting that “the status quo bias is not a mistake—like a calculation 
error or an error in maximizing—that once pointed out is easily recognized and corrected. The bias 
is considerably more subtle”). 
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(and the reasons for it), but seemed unaware (and slightly skeptical) that they 
personally would fall prey” to any particular bias.21 
Unconscious bias (sometimes referred to as implicit bias or hidden bias) 
exists in all areas of life, including both the personal and the political.22 Some 
scholars, including Debra Lyn Bassett and Elayne Greenberg, suggest that 
the best way to minimize unconscious bias is by attacking the issue head on 
through education and related consciousness-raising techniques.23 Other 
experts, most notably Ralph Richard Banks and Richard Thompson Ford, 
believe that focusing on unconscious bias can misdescribe the relevant issues 
and avoid more important substantive concerns.24 Banks and Ford’s analysis 
appears particularly persuasive in the current context, since it is unlikely that 
telling purveyors of alternative facts that they are operating under the 
influence of various unconscious biases will increase the quality of 
deliberative debate, particularly given the volatility of the contemporary 
political environment and the low regard that supporters of alternative facts 
appear to have for scientific research and scholarly endeavors.25 As a result, 
the better course of action may be to focus on the method of communication, 
consistent with Nyhan and Reifler’s observation that “the way in which 
information is delivered could substantially reduce misperceptions” about a 
particular political practice or event.26 
Although Nyhan and Reifler do not themselves provide any 
recommendations on how to proceed, Glaeser and Sunstein, building directly 
on Nyhan and Reifler’s work, suggest that the best way to combat political 
misperceptions is through the use of “surprising validators,” meaning 
individuals and institutions that are credible to persons operating under the 
 
21 Id.; see also Solan, supra note 18, at 10 (discussing “the bias blind spot, which prevents us from 
taking our own biases as seriously as we do the biases of others”). 
22 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Gregory S. Parks, Implicit Bias, Election ‘08, and the Myth of 
a Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 683-88 (2010) (discussing how implicit racial bias 
manifested itself in the 2008 presidential election). 
23 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1572-73 (2013) (providing examples of techniques that “reflect promise in 
overriding unconscious biases”); Elayne E. Greenberg, Fitting the Forum to the Pernicious Fuss: A 
Dispute System Design to Address Implicit Bias and and ‘Isms in the Workplace, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 75, 105 (2015) (arguing that implicit biases in the workplace can be overcome through education). 
24 See Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter? 
Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1121-22 (2009) (suggesting that the recent 
emphasis on implicit racial bias is misguided and that such emphasis “may obscure, or even 
undermine, the substantive goals of racial justice”). 
25 See David Morgan, Government Science Goes Rogue on Twitter, CBS NEWS (Jan. 26, 2017), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/government-science-goes-rogue-on-twitter-resist/ [https://perma.cc/HGB5-
WBPM] (discussing efforts by federal agencies to disseminate scientific information following an 
executive gag order). 
26 Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 3 (manuscript at 1). 
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misperception(s) in question.27 According to Glaeser and Sunstein, the 
inherent authority of the sources counterbalances the negative perception of 
the content of the message, thereby allowing the error to be corrected.28 
Bassett similarly suggests “exposure to actual admired exemplars who are 
counter-stereotypical” as a means of combatting misperceptions arising out 
of unconscious bias.29 
While this solution may succeed in some circumstances and is indeed 
consistent with classical rhetorical principles regarding the importance of 
ethos in legal and political argument,30 it does not contemplate the possibility 
that some individuals or institutions may be incapable of absorbing 
information contrary to their own beliefs, even in situations where the 
authority of the speaker is beyond cavil.31 Sunstein has suggested in other 
writings that certain types of political misperceptions and unconscious biases 
might be resolved through the assistance of a strong executive branch.32 
However, he limited that proposal to situations where “officials within that 
branch can be trusted to make decisions with careful reference to the facts” (emphasis 
his),33 which is not currently the case.34 
 
27 See Glaeser & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 67 (“Messages need to come from sources that are 
seen as credible to the relevant audience and not as likely to be lying (and especially not doing so 
out of desperation). When balanced information produces polarization, it is in part because people 
credit information that is consistent with their preexisting convictions while dismissing information 
that is inconsistent with those convictions. But when information that is unwelcome (in the sense 
that it casts doubt on one’s prior beliefs) comes from someone who is highly credible and difficult 
to dismiss, a change in view is more likely. In this respect, surprising validators can overcome 
asymmetric Bayesianism.”); see also id. at 91 (“Surprising validators have special credibility to 
precisely the people who would otherwise be inclined to dismiss them.”). 
28 Id. at 67, 91. 
29 Bassett, supra note 23, at 1573. 
30 See Greene, supra note 5, at 1398 (suggesting ethos is hierarchically superior to pathos but 
hierarchically inferior to logos in Aristotelian rhetoric). Interestingly, appeals to pathos have increased 
in recent years, which may explain the devaluation of logos among proponents of alternative facts. 
See David M. Zlotnik, The Buddha’s Parable and Legal Rhetoric, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957, 1000 
n.222 (2001) (“More recently, outsider and narrative scholarship has brought pathos into the picture, 
intentionally using the power of stories to create scholarship that makes the reader feel as well as think.”). 
31 See, e.g., Amy B. Wang, Trump Lashes Out at “So-Called Judge” Who Temporarily Blocked Travel 
Ban, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/04/trump-
lashes-out-at-federal-judge-who-temporarily-blocked-travel-ban/?utm_term=.722b18158d63 [https://perma.cc/ 
LX78-VERX] (discussing presidential statements characterizing a federal district court judge as a 
“so-called judge”). 
32 See Cass Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 22. 
33 Id. 
34 See Bradner, supra note 1 (noting that Trump advisor Kellyanne Conway asserted the 2017 
inauguration crowd was larger than that of the 2009 inauguration, although “[a]erial photos—a 2009 
shot from Getty compared to 2017 shots from television broadcasts—show former President Barack 
Obama’s 2009 inauguration appeared to draw a much larger crowd than the one at Trump’s 
inauguration, while Washington’s mass transit ridership and Nielsen television ratings also show 
Obama’s first inauguration was a larger draw”). 
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Misperceptions arising out of inter-group conflict, including what 
Sunstein has called political “partyism,”35 could be addressed by focusing on 
what social psychologists Carolyn and Muzafer Sherif refer to as 
“superordinate goals,” meaning “goals which are compelling and highly 
appealing to members of two or more groups in conflict but which cannot be 
attained by the resources and energies of the groups separately. In effect, they 
are goals attained only when groups pull together.”36 
Finding common ground and common goals is a standard technique used 
by those engaged in integrative negotiation,37 and numerous academics, 
including Carrie Menkel-Meadows and Lawrence Susskind, have suggested 
that these types of communicative techniques, originally developed in the 
conflict resolution field, can offer useful models for democratic deliberation, 
particularly to the extent those mechanisms counteract standard adversarial 
(distributive) paradigms, where one party’s gain is another party’s loss.38 
Although this strand of research does not necessarily address core concerns 
about pervasive misconceptions, it does detail how trust might be built 
between different constituencies so as to trigger application of Glaeser and 
Sunstein’s theory of surprising validators.39 In other words, mechanisms that 
increase trust between conflicting groups may lead members of one group to 
become more willing to listen to facts presented by members of another group, 
even if those facts conflict with the longstanding beliefs of the first group. 
 
35 “Partyism” leads individuals to conclude that any idea that comes from the other political 
party is wrong and should be resisted to the utmost degree. Sunstein, supra note 32, at 1. 
36 Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and “Outsider” Interest Convergence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
1077, 1087-88 (2008) (quoting Muzafer Sherif, Superordinate Goals in the Reduction of Intergroup 
Conflict, 63 AM. J. SOC. 349, 349-50 (1958)); see also Smith, supra (describing the Sherifs’ acclaimed 
study, “The Summer Camp Experiments,” which showed how superordinate goals can minimize 
intergroup conflict and increase cooperation). 
37 Robert J. Condlin, The “Nature” of Legal Dispute Bargaining, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 393, 396-97, 421-22 & n.107 (2016). 
38 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347, 
348-49 (2004) (exploring “the use of alternative legal, political and social problem solving 
institutions that draw on conflict resolution theory and practice. These institutions suggest that 
forms of ‘consensus building,’ which are both ‘principled’ as well as based on ‘bargaining’ models 
(when bargaining does not necessarily entail compromise), may provide useful models for 
democratic participation and political decision making sharply demarcated from the processes we 
currently use”); Lawrence E. Susskind, Consensus Building, Public Dispute Resolution, and Social Justice, 
35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 185, 190-91 (2008) (suggesting “that a commitment to consensus building 
in public decision-making . . . would in fact, deepen our embrace of democratic principles”); see also 
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of 
Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 196 (2002) (noting, inter alia, that the “nastier” 
adversarial bargainers become, the lower their effectiveness ratings). 
39 See Glaeser & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 67 (“Individuals who believe that the messenger is 
a truth teller largely have their beliefs buttressed, while individuals who are skeptical think that the 
message is deceitful, which reinforces and even increases their skepticism.”). 
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The preceding discussion provides a brief glimpse into how the legal 
community might rely on empirical research to determine how best to address 
problems created by the proliferation of alternative facts. The preceding 
examples focus on general issues relating to the alternative fact phenomenon, 
but similar types of interdisciplinary analyses can be used in specific settings. 
For example, psychology has been used to consider how personal and political 
misperceptions and misstatements affect the use of war powers,40 which is an 
issue that could again become important in the coming months and years. 
Those seeking to understand and respond to the increasing use of 
alternative facts need not limit themselves to the social sciences. Empirical 
research from the hard sciences can also be brought to bear on contemporary 
concerns. For example, neuroscience can be used to explain certain aspects of 
the prevailing political climate through reference to a phenomenon known as 
“the winner effect.” As Jayne Barnard notes, 
Scientists now recognize that an animal engaged in some form of combat, if 
victorious, will exit the competition with an elevated level of testosterone. 
The higher the hormone level, the more willing the winner is to engage in 
further combat. This cycle continues until the winner becomes overloaded 
with testosterone and, rather than going forward as a canny and effective 
combatant, becomes a foolish and risk-defying one. Annihilation often 
follows. The impact of testosterone, moreover, does not stop with animals in 
the wild. It has recently been measured, and the “winner effect” observed, 
among traders in the City of London.41 
Although empiricists have not yet studied the winner effect in political 
settings, Barnard has applied these principles to the corporate world, most 
notably to chief executive officers (CEOs) who run afoul of the law.42 Not 
only does Barnard’s and other scholars’ work demonstrate that “the winner 
effect” applies to verbal combat as well as to physical combat, it also provides 
chilling insights into both the causes and future of contemporary political 
debate, particularly as it is played out in conventional and social media. While 
Barnard recognizes that it may be difficult to identify a solution to concerns 
arising from “the winner effect,” since the issue may be triggered “at the 
 
40 See Ganesh Sitaraman & David Zionts, Behavioral War Powers, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 547-71 
(2015) (discussing the problem of decisionmaking bias in matters regarding armed conflict and 
identifying structures already in place that help mitigate the problem). 
41 Jayne W. Barnard, Shirking, Opportunism, Self-Delusion and More: The Agency Problem Lives On, 
48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 747 (2013). 
42 Id.; see also id. at 768 (noting that those prone to the winner effect typically feel “powerful and 
yet invisible, seeming to believe their misconduct would never be uncovered,” which generates a “feeling 
of invulnerability” that leads to taking “extraordinary—and often escalating—risks”); id. at 768-69 
(noting white-collar criminals, including CEOs, often “enjoy a sense of superiority and dominance over 
others” and “like to demonstrate their power and influence in public, self-affirming ways”). 
2017] Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society 145 
molecular level,” she explicitly states that the first step to remedying a 
problem is recognizing that it exists.43 
This Essay has sought to do precisely that by using empirical research to 
demonstrate that conventional means of responding to legal and political 
misconceptions (i.e., content-oriented speech aimed at those who are believed 
to have simply failed to hear the relevant information) are no longer capable 
of fostering and promoting rational discourse.44 While some of the current 
difficulties arise as a result of unconscious bias, those types of cognitive 
distortions are difficult to address directly, and the better option may be to 
approach the issue from a communication perspective—that is, by focusing 
on how information is delivered.45 Not only is that type of response supported 
by empirical research, it also has the benefit of placing the power of change 
in the hands of those who most desire it.46 
Focusing on the method of communication may require a fundamental 
reimagining of how legal and political argument can and should be structured 
if democratic debate in the United States is to survive and thrive. When 
determining how best to proceed, reformers need to adopt a robust 
interdisciplinary approach to ensure the development of a process that is 
capable of addressing psychological, neurological, and social factors driving 
the alternative fact phenomenon. In so doing, the legal community should 
not only take account of data from a wide range of disciplines, including those 
that may have been overlooked in the past,47 it should also coordinate research 
agendas and findings with other sectors of civil society seeking to improve 
the quality of contemporary political discourse.48 Only through this type of 
 
43 Id. at 770. 
44 See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
45 Communication scholarship is both vast and diverse. For an overview of the scholarship, see 
generally NAT’L COMM. ASS’N, COMMUNICATION SCHOLARSHIP AND THE HUMANITIES (2007). 
46 See Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 3 (manuscript at 2) (noting that pervasive 
misconceptions are not based on information deficits and that a change in the method of 
communication may be the only way to reduce those misperceptions); see also Silverman, supra note 
14 (noting that attempts to correct political misperceptions can backfire). 
47 For example, communications theory can provide important insights into the socialization 
of conflict and how rumors and misperceptions are disseminated in today’s digital society. See, e.g., 
Robin Brown, The Contagiousness of Conflict: E.E. Schattschneider as a Theorist of the Information Society, 
5 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 258 (2002) (arguing that political scientist Elmer Eric Schattshneider’s 
work on the socialization of conflict offers important lessons for contemporary audiences); Jill A. 
Edy & Erin E. Risley-Baird, Misperceptions as Political Conflict: Using Schattschneider’s Conflict Theory 
to Understand Rumor Dynamics, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 2596, 2597 (2016) (“People subscribing to a false 
belief are not only receivers of messages but producers.”). 
48 For example, journalists are currently seeking to partner with the legal and academic 
communities to promote well-informed political dialogue. See, e.g., Jay Rosen, Prospects for the 
American Press Under Trump, Part Two, PRESSTHINK (Dec. 30, 2016, 3:53 PM), 
http://pressthink.org/2016/12/prospects-american-press-trump-part-two/ [https://perma.cc/SP9U-LLBJ] 
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well-researched response can the legal community overcome the political, 
legal, and communicative challenges of a post-truth society and navigate the 
brave new world in which we all find ourselves.49 
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(providing suggestions from PressThink, an organization associated with the journalism school at 
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49 See Andrew Postman, My Dad Predicted Trump in 1985—It’s Not Orwell, He Warned, It’s Brave 
New World, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/feb/02/amusing-
ourselves-to-death-neil-postman-trump-orwell-huxley [https://perma.cc/K2J2-XQXF] (discussing 
NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW 
BUSINESS (1985), which anticipated the current legal and political dilemma). 
